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Anti-Essentialism and the Rhetoricization of Knowledge: 
Mario Nizolio’s Humanist Attack on Universals* 
by Lodi Nauta 
Well-known for his Ciceronianism as well as for his crass nominalism and virulent attack 
on universals, the humanist Mario Nizolio (1488–1567) is often considered to be a 
forerunner of early modern philosophy. But although his name duly features in general 
accounts of Renaissance humanism and philosophy, his work, edited by Leibniz in 1670, 
has hardly been the subject of a philosophically sensitive analysis. This article examines 
Nizolio’s attempt to reform scholastic philosophy, paying particular attention to the way 
in which he de-ontologized the scholastic categories and predicables (genus, species, 
etc.) and replaced philosophical abstraction with the rhetorical concept of synecdoche. 
His views on science, proof, argumentation, and rhetoric are discussed, as well as the 
humanist inspiration from which they issue. We will then be able to evaluate the strength 
and limitations of Nizolio’s program in the wider tradition of early modern philosophy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, historians of philosophy, especially the medievalists among them, have 
been reluctant to allot any significant role to the humanists in the demise of Aristotelian-
scholastic philosophy. The humanists’ critique of scholastic terms, terminology, 
approach, and methods was often couched in such strong polemical terms that it has been 
all too tempting to dismiss this critique as superficial, unfair, and philosophically 
irrelevant. The humanists, we are frequently told, simply had a different agenda, pursuing 
the study of classical antiquity and its languages without an inkling of what a scholastic 
philosopher (or his modern colleague) really tried to do.1 For an explanation of the 
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demise of scholastic thought we must look elsewhere, for example, to the rise of the 
empirical sciences that showed that new observations of natural phenomena could not be 
explained by the old paradigm; and also to the development of mathematics, and to what 
has been called a “hermeneutic hypertrophy,” by which is meant such an immense 
increase of knowledge of Aristotle’s works and its late-antique and medieval 
commentators that it led to a watering down of the contours of a once powerful 
paradigm.2 It was this combination of external pressure and erosion from inside the 
Aristotelian-scholastic paradigm, rather than the invectives of the humanists, that resulted 
in its demise. 
There is certainly a lot to be said in favor of this view, but, as this article will 
argue, it is also a rather one-sided view as it ignores an important philosophical aspect of 
this humanist tradition of anti-Aristotelianism, a tradition that includes major humanists 
such as Lorenzo Valla (1406–57), Peter Ramus (1515–72), and Mario Nizolio (1488–
1567). Focusing on the interesting but undervalued work of the sixteenth-century 
humanist Nizolio — whose 1553 De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra 
pseudophilosophos was edited by Leibniz in 1670 because it was “all the more 
appropriate for our times”3 — I will argue that this aspect involves a radical de-
ontologization of the conceptual armory of the scholastics, a turn toward the world of 
empirical things, a recognition of the central role that the human mind plays in our 
categorization of the world, and a plea for a clear, transparent language in doing 
philosophy and communication in general.4 Rejecting universals as essences as well as 
Aristotelian categories and transcendentals, Nizolio wanted to defend a horizontal 
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ontology in which concrete things, grouped in classes by a creative act of the human 
mind, take center stage.  
This article thus aims at providing a case study of a wider phenomenon, summed 
up by Stephen Menn in his survey of “varieties of anti-Aristotelianism”: “Aristotelianism 
had not been nearly as bad as its opponents represented it, and their expectations of what 
they could accomplish through philosophical tyrannicide were unreasonably high. But 
though their first steps towards a new philosophy were stumbling and may be compared 
unfavourably with the accomplishments of late scholasticism, we may see with hindsight 
that their bold experiments prepared the way for the emergence of mechanical philosophy 
and science.”5 To most historians of medieval philosophy this might be too much honor 
for the humanists, some of whom went out of their way to put Aristotle and the entire 
natio peripatetica in the pillory without much discrimination. But even the most 
acrimonious skit can contain a serious philosophical point. And we need think only of the 
staunch critique of scholastic language and concepts by early modern philosophers such 
as Descartes, Hobbes, and Leibniz to realize that the humanists had hit a philosophical 
nerve. Not surprisingly, Leibniz took a keen interest in Nizolio, and, arguably, Nizolio’s 
nominalism suggests affinities with Hobbes, or even, to some scholars, with modern 
linguistic philosophy.6 
Famous in his own time for his Observationes in M. T. Ciceronem (1535), which 
had already gone through more than fifty editions in the sixteenth century, Nizolio’s 
philosophical work was given serious attention only much later thanks to Leibniz’s 
catholic philosophical interests. The name of Nizolio thus duly features in general 
accounts of Renaissance humanism and philosophy.7 In a few perceptive pages Ernst 
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Cassirer praises Nizolio for his emphasis on the concrete world of empirical things and 
their qualities as the subject matter of scientific investigation, arguing that Nizolio 
completed “the empirical critique of Aristotelianism” started by his predecessors, and 
thus “prepared the turn [Wendung] of physical science and theory of knowledge” as 
developed in the dissident natural philosophy of Telesio and others.8 Recently, Erika 
Rummel has suggested that Nizolio’s work is important “because his emphasis on 
experience and sense perception marks the transition from the scholastic method and its 
humanistic alternatives . . . to a more critical scientific method.”9 However, a more 
probing and philosophically sensitive analysis and evaluation of his ideas have hardly 
been attempted.10 This article aims at doing so. I will start by looking at Nizolio’s 
humanist credo, which forms the background of his attack on universals. The central part 
will be an analysis of Nizolio’s criticisms of the traditional five predicables (genus, 
species, differentia, property, accident) by which things were allotted a place in the Tree 
of Porphyry, and his account of the process of abstraction that led to the formation of 
these universals. After a brief discussion of proof and demonstration, and the relationship 
between dialectic and rhetoric, as well as between rhetoric and philosophy, we will be 
able to evaluate Nizolio’s program and assess the claims that it can be considered as a 
preparatory step in the slow and gradual downfall of an old paradigm and the emergence 
of a new one. 
2. FROM A LINGUISTIC POINT OF VIEW: NIZOLIO’S HUMANIST CREDO 
The humanist credo with which Nizolio opened his attack on scholastic philosophy was 
the expression of a life devoted to the study of classical authors, in particular, Cicero. 
Born in Boretto in Reggio Emilia in 1488, Nizolio became tutor in the household of the 
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noble family of the Gambara, and it was to Count Giovanni Francesco Gambara that he 
dedicated his first work, the Observationes in M. T. Ciceronem in 1535.11 Around 1540 
he tried to get a post at the University of Milan but lost to Marco Antonio Maioragio, a 
much younger scholar with whom he exchanged bitter polemics on Cicero between 1546 
and 1548. He was almost sixty when, in 1547, he became professor at the University of 
Parma, and was thus well in his sixties when his De veris principiis appeared in 1553. In 
1562, already seventy-four years old, he was appointed head of the gymnasium in 
Sabbioneta by Vespasiano Gonzaga, and died four years later in 1566. 
Nizolio’s output is not impressive. Apart from the two principal works, the 
Observationes and De veris principiis, he wrote only a few short polemical works against 
Maioragio and Celio Calcagnini. As his modern editor, Quirinus Breen, has remarked: 
“All these writings have a common bond of Ciceronianism.”12 However, Nizolio’s 
reputation as arch-Ciceronian should perhaps be modified. In his style he was no slavish 
imitator of Cicero.13 Erasmus’s Ciceronianus (1528) and the controversies that it and 
other works sparked may have exercised a “moderating” influence on Nizolio’s own 
Ciceronianism.14 Unlike J. C. Scaliger and Stephen Dolet, Nizolio did not attack 
Erasmus, though he must surely have been angered by the Ciceronianus, since in his 
preface to the Observationes he already spoke of (unnamed) “detractors” (obtrectatoribus 
istis) of Cicero.15 His real bête noire, however, became Maioragio, whom he had admired 
earlier in Milan. When Maioragio published his Antiparadoxa in 1546 — in which he 
criticizes Cicero for believing that the Stoic paradoxes are Socratic and for arguing as an 
orator rather than as a real philosopher — Nizolio felt deeply offended and started what 
soon became a vitriolic and unedifying polemic, in which the late Calcagnini also became 
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a target. These polemics address a number of issues that recur in the De veris principiis. 
As has been noted by Breen, Nizolio’s attack on universals was occasioned by the 
controversy about the title of Cicero’s De officiis, a title criticized by Calcagnini, who 
thought that Cicero should have written De officio in the singular.16 Nizolio defended 
Cicero by distinguishing between literal and figurative speech. The point seems utterly 
trivial, but it made Nizolio realize an important point, namely, that a failure to recognize 
the figure of speech of synecdoche (to use the singular for the plural or part for the 
whole) had given rise to the errors not only of Calcagnini and the like but also of the 
many philosophers who believed in the existence of universals. This brings us to his 
major work, De veris principiis. 
One of the assumptions in Nizolio’s attack on scholastic philosophy is that the 
scholastics endorsed, almost tout court, a realist interpretation of the universals. With the 
exception of the nominalists, almost all philosophers from the time of Plato and Aristotle 
onward believed in the existence of universals — whether located in the external world or 
in the human mind — in a way that, in Nizolio’s view, is fundamentally mistaken. This 
belief has wrought so much havoc in philosophy — universals being the foundation of 
metaphysics and dialectics — that Nizolio sees it as his principal task to eradicate 
universals once and for all. A discussion of the various scholastic positions is clearly not 
part of Nizolio’s brief. Medieval authors such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, 
Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham are mentioned but never discussed.17 For Nizolio it 
is enough to bring the scholastic authors under the suitably vague and contemptuous 
name of “pseudophilosophers.” His main targets are the old authorities Aristotle, 
Boethius, and Porphyry, and also some modern authors such as Joachim Périon (1499–
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1559), Johannes Rivius (1500–53), Chrysostom Javellus (ca. 1470–1538), Rudolph 
Agricola (1444–85), and J. L. Vives (1492–1540). The latter two are duly praised for 
their learning and for their critical attitude toward the Aristotelian tradition, yet Nizolio 
thinks they were still too much under the sway of a belief in universals.18 Only Lorenzo 
Valla comes close to Nizolio’s own position. Valla had reduced the ten Aristotelian 
categories to three: substance, quality, and action. He had also reduced the six 
transcendental terms — being, something, thing, true, good, one — to just one: thing 
(res).19 And while Valla continued to use the predicable terms, he heavily criticized the 
Tree of Porphyry for not squaring with reality.20 Moreover, rhetoric, rather than dialectic, 
was the queen of arts, and metaphysics was to be dismissed, in particular because of its 
nefarious influence on theology. According to Nizolio, however, Valla had not eradicated 
the Aristotelian-scholastic system root and branch, and had lopped off only some 
branches and leaves.21 It is left to Nizolio, as he likes to present it, to let the Aristotelian 
edifice crumble at last by destroying its foundations, that is, universals — and, in their 
wake, other basic notions such as transcendentals and categories. His radicalism seems 
unsurpassed: “no other sixteenth-century authors with similar views have so far been 
identified.”22 
Indeed, Nizolio’s aversion to universals does not seem to have been shared by 
many humanists, who were often able to combine a critical attitude toward traditional 
philosophy with a belief in universals as a stable structure of essences.23 We find 
Nizolio’s motivation at the beginning of his work, where he formulates his humanist 
credo in the form of five principles of “correct philosophizing,” much in the spirit of 
Lorenzo Valla and J. L. Vives.24 Next to having a profound knowledge of the classical 
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languages and their literatures, as well as a sound grasp of rhetoric and grammar, we 
should avoid senseless questions and use clear language, introducing new expressions 
and words only if absolutely necessary. And we should follow “the five senses, reason, 
thought, memory, experience and observation,” rather than Plato, Aristotle, or any other 
ancient or more recent author.25  
This last principle — number four on Nizolio’s list — might seem difficult to 
square with his reverence for classical authorities, Cicero in particular. The reverence, 
however, is not absolute, even though Cicero is Nizolio’s most important source of 
inspiration. Cicero himself, as Nizolio does not fail to point out, championed the libertas 
philosophandi. Seeing a matter from various angles, without committing oneself to one 
particular philosophical school, was essential to Cicero’s Academic outlook. Although 
Nizolio might have felt slightly uncomfortable about Cicero’s endorsement of Academic 
skepticism,26 he had no doubts about the importance of the libertas philosophandi, 
formulating it in similar terms as “the freedom and true independence to think and judge 
about all things just as the truth itself and the nature of things require,” and rejecting the 
ancient schools as well as the more recent ones, such as the Albertists, the Thomists, the 
Scotists, and the Averroists.27 That the independence from authority was defended by 
invoking an authority looks inconsistent, but, arguably, the substance of an imperative — 
“don’t follow any authority” or “think for yourself” — is not the same as its support — 
“Cicero is a good example of someone who thinks for himself.” In any case, for Nizolio 
the contrast is not between reason and authority but between the slavish and uncritical 
acceptance of just one authority (as members of a particular school are believed to do) 
and the critical, rational assessment of arguments. There is certainly some rhetorical 
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hyperbole here, but even if Nizolio fell short of this ideal of independent and critical 
thinking, the formulation of the ideal itself is already of some importance. 
Nizolio’s humanist credo clearly forms the background of his campaign against 
universals, and is reflected by the title: De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi 
contra pseudophilosophos. Universals cannot be seen or observed with the senses, being 
but the product of philosophical abstraction. Together with the categories and 
transcendentals and a host of other technical scholastic concepts, they form a theoretical 
superstructure that, according to Nizolio, prevents a clear view of the world of concrete 
things. As we will see below, this belief in universals is the result of a misunderstanding 
of language. To be sure, the Ciceronian Nizolio was convinced of the beauty and 
expressive power of classical Latin, and thus an essential part of his program aims at 
replacing dialectic with rhetoric and at a defense of the Ciceronian union of eloquence 
and philosophy, but it also contains a philosophical point that goes beyond merely 
aesthetic preferences. As his principles already indicate, the language of the great authors 
of antiquity is closely linked to the language of the common people, the populus. The 
former is of course more refined, ornate, and copious, but it had grown out of the latter.28 
To us it might seem strange, not to say even contradictory, to call the highly 
ornate language of the great classical authors common and natural. But since both 
classical Latin and “our common way of speaking”29 were contrasted to the artificial, 
technical, and non-natural language of the scholastics, it was a short step for humanists to 
blur the distinction between learned Latin and the language of the common people, 
particularly when such an elision aided in their fight against that scholastic language. 
They shared the conviction that the linguistic usage of the people reflects the world in a 
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natural way, as opposed to the “unnatural” and “distorted” language of the scholastics.30 
We find, for example, Valla mentioning “the common as well as the learned speech” in 
one breath, and arguing that in its initial stage Latin was very close to the language of the 
vulgus.31 This is not to say that classical Latin was always considered to be a direct and 
unmediated reflection of the world, for compared both to the vernacular language and to 
elementary Latin — which still followed the ordo naturalis, that is, the order of words 
close to the vernacular — classical Latin was certainly one or more levels removed from 
this natural order. Indeed, learning the ornamented prose style of the classical authors 
was to move, to use the medieval terminology, from the ordo naturalis to the ordo 
artificialis.32 These qualifications were probably not lost on Nizolio, but given his 
intention to bring science into direct contact with the world of concrete things, it was 
natural for him to view classical Latin as the common and natural vehicle for expressing 
our view of the world. The full implication of this conviction becomes clear only later, 
but already at the start the basic assumption that drives Nizolio’s program is that 
linguistic abstraction and philosophical abstraction are two sides of the same coin: both 
lead us away from the world of individual, concrete things. 
3. CLASSES OF WORDS AND THINGS 
The attack therefore starts on a linguistic note. General terms such as man and animal and 
also terms such as genus and species themselves are collective terms.33 The general term 
cat does not refer to a substantial form cat-hood, let alone a Platonic Idea Cat, but to the 
class of individual cats, which means no more than all individual cats taken together. 
Nizolio’s argument goes basically as follows. Since words, Nizolio says, were invented 
to refer to things, we must look at words and word classes to see what there, ontologically 
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speaking, is. Yet his presentation follows a different order: since reality “comes first,” he 
starts with dividing things into four classes with corresponding ways of being, and then 
introduces four word classes that exactly correspond with these four categories of 
things.34 Things can be divided into substances and qualities, and these can either be 
singular or a multitude (multitudo). The four ways of being that correspond to these four 
classes of things are: independent existence, to exist in something else, to exist on one’s 
own, and to exist in a composite way, that is, to consist of more than one thing.  
From an ontological point of view, this is a remarkable categorization for 
someone who wants to do away with any kind of abstract entity. One would expect 
Nizolio to have limited his ontology to individual things — that is, individual substances 
and individual qualities — for unless he erroneously thinks a heap of stones to be of the 
same ontological order as the class of stones, he willy-nilly introduces an abstract entity: 
a set or class is of course not the same as a random collection of individuals. As we will 
see, this ambiguity between groups as multitudes and classes runs right through Nizolio’s 
account. What is clear, however, is that Nizolio’s inspiration to come up with this 
fourfold ontological division is linguistic. There are also four word classes, with 
corresponding modes of signification: substantives, adjectives, proper names, and 
appellative names, and each word class refers to an ontological class, for example, 
substantives to individual things, and so on. The clear aim of these divisions is to 
categorize universal terms as collective terms. 
To develop this point Nizolio accepts the traditional distinction between proper 
names and appellative names:  
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proper names      appellative names 
(“Socrates”) 
              
 
1 individual 
simple       collective 
   (“animal”)       (“army”) 
  
 
(three conditions: (three conditions:  multitude 
– said only once –   said often 
– singular –   singular 
– literal) –   non-literal) 
 
          (collective)  
1 individual       multitude 
 
Proper names always refer to a concrete individual, even though we can sometimes use 
the plural to refer to just one individual. An appellative name is defined as a word that is 
common to many individual things and is said of these things in many statements.35 
Appellative names can be divided into collective names such as army, party, folk, nation, 
group, genus, and species, which always refer to a multitude of individual things, and 
what Nizolio calls “simple” appellative names, such as animal, human being, tree, and 
plant. The incorporation of genus and species among the collective names is supported by 
examples from classical authors who use these words always to refer to groups or classes, 
for example, Seneca, “everything we suffer as a mortal genus [mortale genus].” The 
second category of simple appellative names stands in between collective names and 
proper names because these words can refer sometimes to individuals and sometimes to 
groups.36 For example, “human being” (homo) in “Socrates is a human being” refers just 
to Socrates, when said of Socrates only, but when taken in a non-literal sense (figurate), 
the singular human being can also stand for the whole class of human beings. In this case 
terms such as animal, human being, and tree are collective names.37 Nizolio singles out 
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three features of this use of simple appellative names: a singular is used instead of the 
plural, the word is used in a non-literal sense, and such a word is used more than once 
and in more than one statement.38 Thus, if used in its literal sense, “living being” (animal) 
in “Plato is a living being” refers to this one individual and is not a collective name. But 
when used in a series of statements — “man is a living being,” “cow is a living being,” 
“lion is a living being” — and when used in a non-literal sense, the word is a collective 
name, referring to the whole class of living beings:  
For the names man and animal and other such words never signify a genus 
or a species or some common nature except when they are used and 
accepted figuratively. This [common] nature, which is signified by these 
figuratively used words, is nothing else but a multitude composed of 
individuals; and it is a certain discrete whole that truly consists of nothing 
else but singulars. . . . But if these same names man and animal are 
pronounced not just only once, as in the example above, but more often 
and many times, and are accommodated to different referents, they 
immediately stop signifying just one thing but signify many and numerous 
things; thus, for example, when I pronounce the name animal many times 
and accommodate it to diverse referents: “man is an animal,” “cow is an 
animal,” “lion is an animal.”39 
Nizolio thus wants terms to refer either to one singular or to a group as a whole — 
singillatim aut universe sive in universum. There is nothing in between: animal does not 
refer to a universal that is one and common at the same time.  
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Nizolio’s account is hardly satisfactory. He suggests that genus and army are 
collective names in much the same way: just as an individual soldier is part of a cohort, 
the cohort part of a legion, and the legion part of an army, so an individual is part of a 
group of people such as Trojans, this group is part of a wider group, human beings, and 
this group again part of a still wider group, living beings.40 Now the term genus itself 
may be a collective name as used by classical authors but a genus-term such as animal is 
clearly different from army or nation, for while we can say “Socrates is a living being,” 
we cannot say “the soldier is the army.” Nizolio mentions the objection but flatly rejects 
it: genus or species cannot truly (vere) be predicated in the nominative of its species or 
individuals.41 Thus, in “Socrates is a human being,” the term human being is not the 
species when the term is used in its literal sense; it refers just to this one individual. If 
used metaphorically and in many different statements, it refers to the species.42 However, 
the cases remain different, and Nizolio frequently acknowledges this: an army is not a 
genus, he admits, and yet they are both collective names.43  
Moreover, Nizolio is not always clear about the criteria to distinguish the literal 
from the non-literal use of a term. How do we know whether animal refers just to 
Socrates rather than to the whole class of human beings? Some terms, such as genus and 
species, are always collective, while other terms, such as animal, become collective only 
after repetition of statements in which they are used in a non-figurative sense: “P is 
animal,” “Q is animal,” “R is animal.” But Nizolio also states that a term can become 
collective when used only once, for example, “man” in “Socrates is a man.”44 It seems 
then that the term man can become collective in two ways, which are not clearly 
distinguished by Nizolio: (1) after repetition of the term used in its literal sense 
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(“Socrates is a man,” “Plato is a man,” “Cicero is a man”), so that we know (but how do 
we know?) that we have to take man in its non-literal, that is, figurative sense, and that it 
refers to the whole group or species; (2) when used only once in its figurative meaning 
(“Socrates is a man”). Nizolio is unclear on this rather crucial issue, and does not tell us 
how we know when to take a term such as man in its literal and when in its non-literal 
sense. 
These and other difficulties apart, Nizolio’s basic idea is clear: terms refer either 
to one singular or to a group as a whole, as the world consists of things (being the highest 
class) that can be divided in groups, and these groups further subdivided in groups, down 
to the level of individuals.45 Language can easily mislead us into postulating common 
essences, but with a correct understanding of the use of words — singular/plural, 
literal/metaphorical, etc. — we can recognize the root of this error. 
4. PREDICABLES 
But if there are no essences that divide reality at its joints, is any categorization possible 
and as real as any other? What are the criteria according to which we carve up reality in 
the way we do? Sometimes Nizolio gives the impression that he considers any 
categorization as good as any other. To be sure, we tend to group humans with humans, 
and ants with ants, but we can also group the two together — to use Nizolio’s own 
example — if we take as our criterion “taking precautions for the future,” since this is 
what ants and humans have in common.46 Whatever common trait we happen to notice 
among things is sufficient to form a group, a class. On closer inspection of Nizolio’s 
argument, however, it seems that all classes are equal, but some classes are more equal 
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than others. He finds himself speaking of “substantial” and “essential” species.47 Let’s 
see how. 
One strand in Nizolio’s thought is to do justice to the basic ontological picture 
with which he had started. There is just one universal or type of universal: genus, that is, 
a collection of individual things.48 We can use the term species for a smaller collection as 
part of its genus, but ontologically speaking there are only collections, made up of 
individual things. Nizolio has to admit, however, that not every collection is a genus. A 
collection is a genus only when it comprises all the species and individuals that are 
subordinate to it: the genus tree consists of all species of trees (oak, elm, etc.) and their 
individuals. Just as genus is defined in terms of its species, so is species defined in terms 
of its genus, that is, as part of a bigger collection, but it is denied the status of universal, 
because it is always oriented toward its higher genus.49 As soon as it is predicated of 
something subordinate to it, it loses its character of species and becomes a genus, for 
example, the predicate “man” in “John is a man.” Likewise, man and horse are species of 
the genus animal, that is, parts of the collection of things that are animal, but as soon as 
we predicate “man” of “Trojan” or “Theban” — Nizolio’s example borrowed from 
Cicero’s De inventione — it becomes a genus.50 This also applies to the level of 
individuals: as soon as Trojan is predicated of Koriskos, Trojan is the genus and the 
individual Koriskos its species. Indeed, the species specialissimae are not man and horse, 
as in Porphyry’s tree, but individuals.51 Nizolio thus seems to de-ontologize genus and 
species: they seem to be no more than convenient labels for indicating groups and 
subgroups. 
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Strange as this position may seem, it is interesting to note that a similar move can 
be detected in the work of Peter Ramus. As Walter J. Ong suggested a long time ago, 
Ramus saw, perhaps unconsciously, the world as consisting of little corporeal units, or 
“simples,” which can be grouped into clusters, and these combined with other clusters, 
and so forth: “Ramus thus tends to view all intellectual operations as a spatial grouping of 
a number of these corpuscles into a kind of cluster, or as a breaking down of clusters into 
their corpuscular units.”52 All these clusters or groupings are called genera, which leads 
Ramus to conclude that individuals and species are exactly the same thing.53 Nizolio does 
not quote Ramus in his work, but since he frequently refers to Périon’s Dialecticae libri, 
a work that also included Périon’s two orations against Ramus, he may have been 
acquainted with Ramus’s Aristotelian critique. (Ramus’s Dialecticae institutiones and his 
Aristotelicae animadversiones were published in 1543.)54 A certain affinity is further 
visible in Nizolio’s argument that man and woman are two different species of the genus 
human being (homo), just as Trojan and Theban are different species of that same genus 
— a position Ramus also defended. This was a highly unconventional position, the 
defense of which helped to outlaw Ramism in late sixteenth-century Leipzig.55 For 
Nizolio, however, it was a logical outcome of his position that species are parts of genus. 
He heavily criticizes Vives, who had argued against Cicero that woman and man, just like 
Trojan and Theban, are only accidental, non-essential qualifications of the species human 
being; man and woman do not contribute to the essential form, but only concern the 
“matter.” In a remarkable reference to transsexuality Vives had written that people who 
had changed their sex did not receive thereby a different essence.56 Nizolio replies that, 
even though we can make a difference between, on the one hand, non-essential, 
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accidental, or “external” species — such as man/woman and Theban/Trojan of their 
genus human being — and, on the other hand, essential, “inner and natural” species — 
such as human being and horse of their genus animal — the former are no less species 
than the latter, because they can all be considered as subgroups of a larger group, the 
genus. The relationship between genus and species can thus be “essential” or 
“accidental”: a white wall and a white cloth belong to the genus of white things, yet their 
inclusion is of an accidental kind since their whiteness is something accidental. But his 
reply to Vives becomes inconsistent when he says that someone who belonged to the 
genus human being goes over to the genus woman on changing his sex, for he had started 
his argument stating that man and woman were two species of the genus human being.57 
It is the same kind of double talk that Ong ascribed to Ramus, and “which drove Ramus’s 
opponents frantic.”58 
The admittance of essential versus accidental species looks like a fatal blow to his 
nominalist program, but Nizolio does not think so. He tries to handle all subordinations of 
species under genus in purely extensional terms.59 Horse is an “essential” species of 
animal because there is no horse that is not an animal, while a white wall belongs only 
accidentally to the genus white because there are walls that are not white. And a Theban 
belongs, as human being, essentially to the genus man, but as a Theban only accidentally 
so. But of course this suggests that all horses (or all humans, etc.) have something in 
common, which is the reason why we put them in one species subordinated to the genus 
animal in the first place. Does this not imply the existence of an essence or an essential 
quality, in other words, a universal? Nizolio does not think so, claiming that the universal 
simply is the collection of, say, horses or white things. But can we not say then that an 
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army is a genus after all, with the soldiers as individual species? Nizolio must explain 
what the criteria are to categorize things. This would require, however, a revision of the 
traditional predicables.  
This is indeed what he tries to do. The intention seems to de-ontologize the 
predicables by suggesting that there are more criteria to categorize things than the 
traditional five predicables, and that all these criteria are reducible to genera. The 
differentia rational is the class, or genus differens, of rational beings.60 The property 
(proprium) sensation is the class or genus proprium of things that have sensation, and so 
on. The criteria that Nizolio adds are difficult to distinguish from the traditional ones: we 
can group things because they have something in common (communia), for example, 
having a body, which gives the class of living and non-living things. We can also group 
things because they are similar, giving the class genus simile — for example, ants and 
humans, both taking precautions for the future — or because they are contrary to each 
other, such as vice and virtue. More problematic is Nizolio’s introduction of “substantial” 
as a criterion, giving the class genus substantiale, for example, animal for man, since 
“animal resides [insitum] in the substance of man, without which man cannot exist at 
all.”61 
Nizolio’s attempt to blur the line between the criteria by which we group things 
and the class that we get as a result is, of course, highly problematic, but it was perhaps a 
natural reading of traditional authorities, such as Porphyry and Boethius, which latter 
writes that “to animal are subordinated the species rational and non-rational.”62 Also, the 
difficulty of distinguishing clearly between different types of accidents was something 
that Nizolio inherited from tradition. In Porphyry’s Isagoge, for instance, it is left unclear 
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how property differs from differentia and also from non-separable qualities such as the 
Ethiopian’s blackness, mentioned by Porphyry in his chapter on accidents.63 Property was 
defined as what occurs in the entire species, in it only, and always, as the capacity to 
laugh in man, but the differentia rationality would fit this definition equally well.64 It was, 
however, a difficulty that Nizolio put to his own advantage in his fight against what he 
saw as a rigid and hierarchical system of fixed and essentialist predicables.65 In claiming 
that all predicables are genera, he denies that there are basic differences between them: 
they are all the same and only differ, as he states in one of his more polemical moments, 
“in their relation to what is subordinated or superordinated to them.”66 Having sensation 
is a differentia dividing plants from animals, but a property when related to the class of 
living beings, that is, a property shared by rational and non-rational beings.67 
Evidently, there are some deep tensions in Nizolio’s program as analyzed so far, 
tensions that suggest that it was not easy to employ consistently a purely extensional 
approach of groups and the individuals out of which they exist. We may note the 
following points. (1) On the one hand, Nizolio singles out “seven or eight” (septem vel 
octo) predicables, which, as we have seen, he identifies with genera (using the traditional 
Porphyrian term genera subalterna), thereby suitably conflating the criteria by which we 
group things and the groups themselves. But if white is a genus to which, for example, 
the wall and the cloth belong because they are (accidentally) white, then we can have 
many more classes, in fact, just as many as there are qualities. Nizolio seems thus to heap 
together not only groups and criteria — such as having something in common or being 
contradictory to each other — but also qualities such as whiteness. Indeed, the class of 
qualities is very broad: not only can we make a genus of, for example, white things, but 
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also one consisting, to give Nizolio’s own example, of ants and human beings. (2) This 
raises the question of the precise ontological status of classes. On the one hand, Nizolio 
defends a horizontal picture of the world: there are only individual things that can be 
grouped in broader or narrower classes, but they are all at the same ontological level; 
there is no hierarchy of essences. On the other hand, he clearly distinguishes between 
individuals and groups, a distinction that seems to give groups their own ontological 
status, irreducible to the individuals out of which they exist: genera are “eternal” and 
“immortal.”68  
This leads to a further tension: (3) Nizolio argues that the genus is the only 
universal: as class it is called a thing, that is, a thing of things.69 Classes are real things in 
the world. But we also find Nizolio often saying that only words can be general, but 
neither things nor concepts.70 What he means is that universals cannot be those 
mysterious entities that he thinks scholastic philosophers operate with — entities that are 
not one (for they are predicated of many things), nor many (for it is the same predicate 
said of different individuals) — but that only words can be general, that is, used to refer 
to a group of things. He therefore seems to apply the term universal to things (that is, 
genera) but also to words, while he himself repeatedly accuses the “pseudophilosophers” 
of confusing things and words that refer to things.  
(4) The last point is closely related to the previous one. While Nizolio claims to 
follow the nominalists in stating that only words can be universal,71 his treatment does 
not follow the terminist approach of Ockham at all. Ockham had argued that genus, 
species, and other universals are nothing but terms of second intention, that is, logical 
terms.72 The predicamental order consists not of things but of our mental concepts, which 
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are ordered according to the scope of their predication. Nizolio, however, equates 
universals with the genera, that is, with things, because he believes only words — neither 
things nor concepts — can be general in the sense of referring to many things. What he 
does not seem to realize is that for a nominalist, concepts, being certain intentions of the 
mind, are singular entities that can stand for many things. It is not surprising, therefore, to 
find nothing equivalent to Ockham’s mental language of our concepts in Nizolio’s 
scheme.73  
5. COMPREHENSIO VERSUS ABSTRACTION 
But if universals are to be equated with collections of individuals, how do we make these 
collections? How do we arrive at our categorizations? For Nizolio the central question in 
the debate on universals becomes all the more pressing: are groups or genera simply a 
product of the individual human mind, or are they somehow out there in reality, to be 
reflected in our mind? Nizolio’s convictions lead him to embrace — hardly consciously 
— both positions at the same time. On the one hand, his whole project is aimed at 
reestablishing a direct contact between the human mind and the world of concrete things. 
The abstract entities that we are supposed to find hidden in things and then abstract from 
them are merely the product of the philosopher’s imagination and have led us away from 
the world of concrete things.74 He must claim that his universals, his genera, constitute 
reality itself, and indeed we often find him doing so: they are made by nature (a natura 
facta).75 On the other hand, his de-essentializing program, flattening out the hierarchical 
picture of his so-called opponents, brings with it a major role for the human mind, which 
has the capacity to group individuals in many different ways. Such relativism, however, 
should not be taken too far. Analyzed as substances with their qualities, things are out 
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there, and even though they can be grouped in many different ways, the qualities picked 
out by the human mind are real aspects of the world and not invented.  
Nizolio’s solution is to substitute abstraction with comprehensio, an act of the 
human mind that gathers together all the individuals of a genus “simultaneously and at 
once” (simul et semel): such genera, taken together, are the subject matter of the sciences 
and scientific propositions and argumentation. It is a “philosophical and oratorical act,” 
he says, by which he means an act of comparing things and seeing the similarities 
between them.76 It is a philosophical act, since it plays an important role in philosophy, 
where definitions are based on similarities between things: when we define a human 
being as a rational, mortal animal we thereby define the whole class of human beings, 
that is, all men and women, on account of their similarities. In spite of his professed 
hostility to everything Aristotelian, Nizolio is indebted to Aristotle for this crucial notion, 
and he approvingly quotes from Aristotle’s Topics, where the importance of an 
examination of likeness for deductions, inductions, and definitions is stressed.77 What is 
said of one member of a class applies to all of them on account of the similarities noticed, 
or “comprehended.”78 It is an “oratorical act” because we find the trope of using the 
singular instead of the plural — or part instead of the whole, or one thing instead of a 
plurality or the entire group — often used by orators, poets, and prose writers. It is what 
rhetoricians call intellectio, or synecdoche, but it is not something limited, Nizolio 
stresses, to refined literate language or orations.79 Also in daily speech (sermo 
quotidianus) common people (populus, vulgus) use this figure, when they use singular for 
plural, part for whole, or one thing for a multitude or an entire class (or vice versa).80 
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Synecdoche seems to be the linguistic expression of comprehensio: in order to talk about 
a class or group of things one must be able to gather mentally all its individuals.81 
But what exactly is comprehensio? Nizolio does not give us any details. It does 
not seem to be a process but rather an instantaneous grasp of a group, as he compares it to 
seeing a herd.82 The idea seems to be that when, for example, a biologist speaks about 
bats he is talking about the entire class of bats, taking all bats simultaneously together, all 
at once. Science is not about essences or universals that must first be abstracted from the 
concrete objects, but it is about these objects themselves, or rather about the genera in 
which they are grouped.83 Knowledge is primarily to be had of groups or classes. But 
here too Nizolio’s account is not wholly nominalist, in spite of his claim to follow the 
nominales. According to Ockham, a universal such as dog is produced in the mind on 
seeing a dog and noting its essential feature.84 This similitude can then stand for all the 
objects resembling each other and this concept. Though it is a particular act of the mind it 
can stand universally for all its referents, by virtue of its resemblance to each of them. 
Nizolio, however, does not accept any kind of abstractionist account of knowledge, and 
places universals outside the mind: they are the genera out there, comprehensively 
understood by the scientist, the orator, or whoever speaks about the world, making 
categorizations and statements about them and about their mutual relations.85 
But does Nizolio not simply beg the central issue? To claim something about bats 
is to talk about the class of bats, about all individual bats taken together. But on the basis 
of what do we take them together? It is tempting to give an answer along Ockhamist 
lines: we take them together because we have gone through a process of abstraction 
before, abstracting the essential feature of bats and using that feature as our mental 
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concept and as a natural sign to stand for each individual bat. Nizolio’s revolt against 
abstraction makes such an answer impossible, and though he assigns an important role to 
the mind in comprehending the genus simul et semel, he avoids talking about mental 
concepts. Yet he does not deny that we consider things in separation from each other, for 
example, a quality from its substance, a quality from other qualities, a line from its 
surface or subject, and so forth.86 This is indeed what the mind does in comprehending 
simul et semel all individual qualities without their substances, or all individual lines 
without their matter. We do not abstract or separate things but simply grasp things under 
a particular aspect, ignoring other aspects. In his edition of Nizolio’s work, Leibniz writes 
here that such a position — abstracting is nothing but considering an object without 
considering other objects — “has lately been inculcated in many by Thomas Hobbes.”87 
We thus see Nizolio tackling both horns of the dilemma at once. Are 
categorizations the product of our mind, or are they already out there, waiting as it were 
to be “comprehended” by an act of the mind? Redefining universals in terms of genera — 
that is, identifying universals with the classes of objects themselves rather than with 
mysterious essences that have to be dug up through a laborious process of abstraction — 
Nizolio thinks he can claim that we can categorize things in many different ways. To use 
a modern example, we may group bats with bats (one sort) but also with birds (aspect of 
flying), or, alternatively, with whales and dolphins (making use of echolocation), 
depending on our questions and interests, but the classes, constructed by the human mind, 
are always part of reality. It looks like a shrewd alternative to the mind-world identity as 
defended by moderate realists such as Thomas Aquinas, according to whom the mind and 
the world are structurally identical.88 Nizolio simply skips the whole process of 
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transforming bodily information into an immaterial state by way of sensible and 
intelligible species, nor does he offer an Ockhamist account in terms of intuitive and 
abstract cognition. But without further explanation, his notion of mental comprehension 
seems a lot more mysterious than the scholastic process of abstraction, although he can 
claim that his account does not introduce mysterious entities such as universals. 
6. SCIENCE, PROOF, AND ARGUMENTATION 
As I have explained, one of Nizolio’s aims is to bring science in direct contact with the 
world of concrete things by lifting the veil of scholastic categories, transcendentals, and 
universals that had blocked, so he thinks, our view of the world.89 One of the reasons why 
universals had been postulated, Nizolio writes, was the idea that science could not be 
about individuals since they are corruptible;90 hence, the need for a stable, eternal 
structure of essences. But if science is about collections of individual objects, does that 
not make scientific truth dependent on their actual existence here and now? Indeed, one 
of Nizolio’s principal sources, Agricola in his De inventione dialectica, said that in order 
for knowledge and definitions to be possible, things must exist now or in the future.91 
Nizolio must argue that his universals, the genera as classes of things, can be the object of 
statements that for their truth are not dependent on the actual existence of individual 
members of the classes, and indeed we find him making the claim that classes themselves 
are “eternal and immortal.”92 Classes comprise not only actual members of a class here 
and now but also those of the past and the future. It is not easy to reconcile this claim 
with other strands in his thinking as analyzed above, such as the flexibility in the mind’s 
grasp of universals and the equation of a class or a genus with its individuals. Leibniz 
therefore seems correct in remarking that Nizolio cannot get out of this so easily.93 
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Nizolio must either admit that induction never gives us certain knowledge (we have 
experience only of a limited number of cases) or that the mind’s comprehensio of the 
universal is not based on individual cases at all. Nizolio was not yet ready to take the first 
horn of the dilemma, but the other horn would come close to reifying the genus, 
something which, of course, would go wholly against the spirit of his reform. One way 
out of the dilemma would perhaps be to view universals as meanings that can be fixed by 
definition. Arguably, such an approach, by which the extension of a universal or general 
idea is defined by its content, was developed by Locke, but this is clearly not a feasible 
option for Nizolio.94 
A further consequence of his extensional approach is to redefine the nature of 
syllogisms. In arguing syllogistically, Nizolio says, we move from wholes to parts, rather 
than from universals to particulars, and — in the case of induction — from parts to 
wholes rather than vice versa.95 Proving something is basically showing that a part (an 
individual, a class) is part of a bigger group, rather than showing that a genus can be 
predicated of each of its members. One proves that Socrates is a living being by taking as 
premises that the class of living beings contains the class of human beings, and the class 
of Socrates (just one member) is part of the class of human beings, as if one were 
drawing increasingly smaller concentric circles. Perhaps Nizolio thought (erroneously) 
that such terminology of classes containing other classes or being contained in other 
classes would suppress a belief in universals — although, of course, one can be a 
nominalist concerning universals but still defend the attribution of essential predicates to 
things.96  
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In any case, he rejects the principles of dici de omni et nullo of Aristotelian logic, 
which also played an important role in Ockham’s logic: “I say that correctly formed 
syllogisms do not derive their power of concluding and proving in a necessary way from 
the two principles that I mentioned, that is, dici de omni (predicated of all) et dici de nullo 
(predicated of none), but from this, that is, that one or more parts of some discrete or 
continuous whole exist or do not exist, or are contained or are not contained, in some 
discrete or continuous whole, and that for this reason narrow genera always exist or not 
exist, or are contained or not contained, in some other wider genera.”97 According to 
these principles, rejected by Nizolio, nothing is taken under the subject of which the 
predicate is not also asserted (de omni), or the predicate is denied of whatever the subject 
is affirmed (de nullo).98 Only the moods of the first figure of the syllogism — in which 
the middle term is subject of one premise and predicate of the other — are immediately 
regulated by this principle, those of the second and third only mediately. Nizolio does not 
show any interest in syllogistics as such, and, unlike his fellow anti-Aristotelian Valla, 
does not review the different figures and moods.99 His point is that syllogistic reasoning 
is based on a comparison of classes of wider or smaller scope rather than predicating 
universal features of all individuals of a class. 
7. RHETORIC: RES AND VERBA 
Having rejected universals, Nizolio thinks he has put dialectic and metaphysics, in which 
universals play a central role, in their place. Rhetoric, if properly defined, is the queen of 
arts. Again, Nizolio is more radical here than his humanist predecessors. Valla had 
subordinated dialectic to rhetoric, but still conceded a small preparatory stage to the 
former. Agricola had defined dialectic as the art of speaking convincingly or plausibly 
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(probabiliter) about any subject, as suitably as possible.100 Most humanists tried to erode 
the boundary between dialectic and rhetoric, but did not aim at completely dissolving it. 
Nizolio wants to go further, broadening the scope of both logic and rhetoric such that 
they come down to much the same thing. Once this is established, the way would be clear 
to argue, as many humanists had already done, that philosophy is essentially a rhetorical 
subject, and that we must return to the fusion of rhetoric and philosophy, of eloquence 
and reason, as defended and propagated by Cicero. With this aim in mind, Nizolio 
distinguishes the “false logic” of the pseudophilosophers from the “true logic,” which he 
defines as the art of speaking well about whatever kind of subject. It is the art that 
concerns all kinds of communication: discussing, disputing, speaking, and discoursing on 
all types of questions and about all kinds of subjects, written or spoken.101 It is then a 
short step to identify this true logic with rhetoric, which Nizolio claims is broader than 
the specialized field of forensic oratory. Following Cicero and Quintilian, Nizolio defines 
rhetoric as the art of speaking well.102 Having broadened both disciplines in this way, 
Nizolio equates logic (or dialectic) with rhetoric. The two disciplines do not essentially 
differ in their subject-matter (they treat all subjects), their questions (they both treat 
general and more specific questions, that is, theses and hypotheses), means of 
argumentation (both use syllogisms, induction, enthymemes, and example), and 
techniques (they both use the question-and-answer technique) and their tasks.103  
With this equation between dialectic and rhetoric in place, it must have been 
tempting for Nizolio to equate rhetoric with philosophy tout court, but he sticks to the 
Ciceronian distinction between philosophy as knowledge and wisdom and rhetoric as the 
verbal expression of this knowledge. The two, however, are intimately connected. “The 
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science of wise thinking” and “elegant speaking” are two sides of the same coin, and 
Nizolio ardently defends this union of brain and tongue, of reason and eloquence, of 
philosophy and rhetoric.104 The two are not separate areas, but one organic whole, just 
“as body and soul constituting one living being.” In Cicero’s own words, duly quoted by 
Nizolio: “Every speech consists of matter and words, and the words cannot fall into place 
if you remove the matter, nor can the matter have clarity if you withdraw the words.”105 
The assumption is that clear and transparent language is a sine qua non for clear thinking: 
indeed, the assumption, as we have seen above, was explicitly formulated by Nizolio as 
one of the essential conditions for “true and correct philosophizing,” alongside a 
profound knowledge of the classical languages and their literature, as well as of grammar 
and rhetoric.106 
Does such a position result in what some scholars have called, in a rather grand 
phrase, “the verbalization of the world”?107 For if things can only be grasped and brought 
to light and understood if we use the right language — which is the language of the 
common people, developed and refined by the great authors of classical antiquity — does 
this not imply that our view of the world is somehow shaped by language? If knowledge 
and reasoning are based on the way we comprehend individuals as members of groups, 
and if this act of comprehensio is also an oratorical act, as Nizolio explicitly argues, then 
language seems to determine the ways in which we categorize the world. Such an 
intimate connection between words and things may render it difficult to distinguish 
between res and verba. And, indeed, scholars have argued that the line between the two 
becomes blurred in many a humanistic text. Discussing Erasmus’s De copia, Terence 
Cave, for example, has argued: “Res are neither prior to words as their ‘origin,’ nor are 
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they a productive residue which remains after the words cease. Res and verba slide 
together to become ‘word-things’; the notion of a single domain (language) having a 
double aspect replaces that of two distinct domains, language and thought.”108  
In a similar vein some scholars, particularly in the German-speaking world, have 
interpreted Nizolio’s position in terms of a “verbalization or linguification of the world 
[Versprachlichung der Welt],” “a unity of word and thing,” and “a comprehensive speech 
act [Sprechakt]” that has an essentially cognitive function and aim, or perhaps a “pre-
cognitive” function: in comprehending things semel et simul we first form groups of 
things in a kind of intuitive act, and only at a second stage do we use these groups or 
categorizations in our discourses, definitions, and proofs.109 This interpretation, however, 
is too far-fetched. Admittedly, Nizolio gives cause for such a reading, as he does not 
explain how our grasp or comprehension of things as one group or class relates to the 
rhetorical figure of synecdoche or intellectio: does the latter shape the way in which we 
make our categorizations, or is it merely an outer verbalization of the inner mental act of 
comprehension? But it goes too far to suggest or to imply that he equates the act of 
thinking with its linguistic expression. Indeed, it would be very strange to say that our 
capacity to grasp the whole class of individual dogs when we recognize, for example, that 
Bello is a dog, is the same as the linguistic expression “Bello is a dog,” or is constituted 
by it. In general, Nizolio assumes that words refer to things. Indeed, he makes it quite 
clear that we should not mix up words and things, for it is precisely mistaking words for 
things that had led to the postulation of universals by the “pseudophilosophers.”110  
This would still leave open the possibility that comprehensio precedes discursive 
reasoning, but there is no textual evidence in Nizolio for a distinction between, on the one 
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hand, the creative, rhetorical act of comprehensio — in which “word and thing are 
unified” and in which “the world is grasped in its historicity and contingency” — and, on 
the other hand, the “rational, scientific and logical” thought that would follow upon such 
an intuitive understanding.111 Indeed, Nizolio explicitly argues that synecdoche is used in 
definitions, syllogisms, proofs, and arguments, as well as in other kinds of forms of 
language.112 This suggests that there is no two-step process of (1) a pre-rational 
comprehension-synecdoche and (2) a rational-logical processing of the intuitive insights 
gained in step 1. What such a statement does imply, however, is that the mental grasping 
and the verbal expression of what we grasp are interlinked. While it goes too far to 
ascribe to Nizolio a verbalization of thought, it is perhaps not too far-fetched to speak of 
a rhetoricization of knowledge. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS: NIZOLIO’S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
What is the significance of Nizolio’s attempt to replace the doctrine of universals and the 
concomitant notion of abstraction with an extensional approach in which classes are 
groups of individuals grasped simultaneously and comprehensively by the mind? 
Historically, the attempt failed, as Nizolio’s philosophy — to paraphrase Leibniz — 
suffered suffocation almost as soon as it saw the light.113 While Nizolio’s humanist work 
on Cicero enjoyed immense popularity, his attack in De principiis on universals and other 
basic tenets of Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy remained without much response, 
unlike the even more virulent attacks by Peter Ramus, which would soon provoke 
widespread controversy.  
But it would be wrong to judge his radical critique as philosophically irrelevant 
for that reason. With hindsight we can interpret his critique of the scholastic conceptual 
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armament as aiding, however modestly, in the erosion of a once-powerful paradigm, 
thereby helping to create intellectual space for the emergence of new developments in 
science and philosophy. It seems too much to claim, as Cassirer did, that Nizolio was “the 
culmination of the empirical criticisms of Aristotelian philosophy,” since Nizolio did not 
directly contribute to natural philosophy himself.114 Yet, standing in a longer tradition of 
anti-Aristotelianism, Nizolio’s criticism of universals, essences, and abstraction may be 
regarded as a necessary preparatory step in the slow demise of the Aristotelian paradigm. 
In taking individuals to be grouped in classes on the basis of similarity grasped by the 
human mind, Nizolio thinks he has no use for substantial forms and essences, let alone 
divine archetypes. In this he is even more radical than Valla — who still referred, though 
incidentally, to the Augustinian notion of divine illumination and was ambiguous about 
universals — and certainly more radical than Agricola (a realist of some sort), Vives, and 
Melanchthon.115 Nizolio is wholly secular in his approach, omitting any reference to a 
divine mind whose ideas would function as eternal archetypes, equating God with nature 
(a Deo sive a natura . . . opifice), and stating that God and all divine things are truly res 
naturales.116 
His horizontal, lean ontology of only individual substances and qualities, grouped 
in classes, has clear affinities with Ockhamist nominalism, and this brings us to a second 
point. It may be tempting to associate his idea — that the real universals are genera that 
the human mind forms in a comprehensive act — with Ockham’s theory of concepts as 
intellectual acts in which the act itself stands for a thing known. However, as we have 
seen, many of his claims do not fit in with the Ockhamist program of establishing a 
mental language of concepts as grounding spoken and written language. Nizolio himself 
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invokes consistently the rhetorical notion of comprehensio rather than Ockham’s theory. 
Nizolio does not speak about concepts in the mind that have meaning by nature — an 
important Aristotelian idea that undergirds Ockham’s account — or about concepts as 
singular entities.117 Thus, while for Nizolio universals are out there, for Ockham 
universals are concepts, singular entities that can stand for the individuals resembling the 
concept and each other. But as we have seen, Nizolio’s notion of universal is ambiguous, 
for while he clearly wants to de-essentialize Aristotelian philosophy by defining 
universals in terms of classes, the cognitive act by which the individuals are grasped as a 
class might also be assigned the role of universal. And in spite of his rejection of any kind 
of reification or hypostatization, he also speaks of universals as being “eternal” and 
“immortal.” His basic conviction remains firm, however: individuals and groups 
(singillatim aut universe sive in universum) should be the object of knowledge and 
scientific statements, rather than forms and predicables being reified or hypostatized. It is 
therefore not surprising that Nizolio puts experience and sense perception on his list of 
the true principles of “correct philosophizing.” 
Thus, Nizolio’s basic conviction is that hypostatization and reification, rooted in a 
misunderstanding of common language, have bedeviled philosophy, and have impeded a 
fresh look at the world of concrete, empirical things. This has led scholars to link him not 
only with Ockham, to whom Nizolio himself refers, but also with a modern philosopher 
such as Gilbert Ryle (1900–76), who thought that universals are the product of a 
misunderstanding of terms.118 For Ryle the question of what sort of objects universals are 
is a “bogus question.”119 Universals such as justice and rationality are not objects in the 
way in which dogs and tables are objects, and general nouns and adjectives are not proper 
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names that refer to a particular object. It is the grammatical form of such propositions, 
however, that might tempt us (“us” philosophers, Ryle adds) into thinking, erroneously, 
that universals denote objects, while in fact they do not. Hence, philosophy is the 
reformulation of such “systematically misleading expressions.” While such a comparison 
may indeed be used as a hermeneutic tool to recognize and tease out the philosophical 
relevance of ideas of a humanist such as Nizolio, it is obvious that Ryle’s analysis in 
terms of categories and category mistakes is fundamentally different from Nizolio’s anti-
realist argument, which focuses on universal terms as collective terms, and on the correct 
understanding of synecdoche. 
A philosopher who did see himself as a sort of ally of Nizolio was Leibniz, the 
editor of the humanist’s work. Leibniz regarded Nizolio as a nominalist, and for this 
reason “all the more appropriate for our times,” since “nothing is truer” than the “rule” of 
the nominalists “that everything in the world can be explained without any reference to 
universals and real forms.”120 However, Nizolio also made “many and great errors,” and a 
very serious one concerns precisely the central idea of universals as nothing more than all 
singulars taken simultaneously and collectively.121 According to Leibniz, the universal is 
not an aggregate or a “collective whole,” but a “distributive” whole or logical whole: 
“when we say every man is an animal or all men are animals, the acceptation is 
distributive; if you take that man (Titius) or this man (Caius), you will discover him to be 
an animal.”122 For if the collective whole of all human beings is the same as the genus 
man, we would get absurd propositions such as “the whole genus is an animal,” or “for if 
they are the same, we may substitute the whole genus man in the proposition that all men 
are animals or every man is an animal.” The concept man as being a rational animal is 
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independent from the number of instances that we find in the world. Even if there were 
no human beings on earth, it would still be true to say that man is a rational animal.123 For 
the young Leibniz of the 1670 preface to his Nizolio edition, the meaning of a concept is 
not the same as its extension.124  
Moreover, Nizolio’s position does not leave much independent work for the mind 
to do: the mind simply grasps a collective whole, and in arguing and proving adds and 
subtracts classes in arithmetical fashion. But Leibniz wants to assign a much more active 
role to the mind: it adds its own universal propositions to inductively gained data so that 
we can arrive at truly universal knowledge. From Nizolio’s position on universals, “it 
would follow that we could attain no knowledge through demonstration — a conclusion 
which Nizolio actually draws — but only through collecting individuals or by 
induction.”125 But induction can never result in “true universality.” Without discussing 
Leibniz’s position in more detail, one might see these early remarks, provoked by the 
reading of Nizolio, as early anticipations of his more mature view of the Discours de 
métaphysique from 1686, in which concepts are said to be “so complete that it is 
sufficient to contain and allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to 
which this notion is attributed.”126 Nizolio — among many other thinkers, of course — 
was important in order for Leibniz to develop his own thoughts about concepts and 
predication. 
Leibniz was not only critical about Nizolio. In the same preface he praises him for 
having recognized the importance of a clear, non-technical style in philosophy, and he 
defends the principle that “whatever cannot be explained in popular terms is nothing and 
should be exorcised from philosophy as if by an incantation, unless it can be known by 
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immediate sense experience.”127 Like Nizolio, Leibniz thinks that the “passion for 
devising abstract words has almost obfuscated philosophy for us entirely.” But while 
sharing Nizolio’s plea for a common language in philosophizing, Leibniz has omitted 
elegance from the three praiseworthy marks of speech (clarity, truth, and elegance), 
“since our discussion concerns philosophical discourse and the style that befits it.” Not 
surprisingly, he considered Nizolio’s principles of correct philosophizing, which included 
knowledge of classical languages and their literature as well as grammar and rhetoric, 
“principles of speech rather than of thought.”128 Thus, although he presented Nizolio as 
an excellent guide toward a “sober, proper, natural, and truly philosophical way of 
speaking,” his omission of elegance from philosophical style suggests that the Ciceronian 
link between verba and res, style and content, elegance and clarity-truth, was no longer 
felt as intimate and intrinsic in the way in which humanists such as Nizolio had done.129 
Nizolio’s project clearly had its philosophical limitations. But, as this article has 
suggested, it gains in interest when we consider it as an example of what Menn described 
as the “bold experiments” of the anti-Aristotelians, experiments that “with hindsight” we 
may see as preparing “the way for the emergence of mechanical philosophy and 
science.”130 In stressing observation and sense perception while rejecting what he 
considered to be the essentialist and fixed categories of the Aristotelian-scholastic 
system, Nizolio aimed at making room for the inquisitive human mind to categorize the 
world with flexible classes. And it is these classes, as real universals, that should be the 
true subject matter of general statements to be qualified and modified as our knowledge 
advances. 
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* I am grateful to two anonymous readers for RQ for comments and suggestions. 
1 To give just one recent statement by a distinguished historian of philosophy, Pasnau, 8: 
“the Scholastics had the great virtue of being relatively uninterested in rhetoric and 
utterly unconcerned with compromising philosophical rigor for the sake of popular 
accessibility. They shared the view of the contemporary analytic tradition that the best 
philosophy will often be technical, difficult, and perhaps comprehensible only to 
specialists.” The sentiment is widespread, also among Renaissance scholars, who often 
follow the lead of Kristeller, 90–91, 101: “the Italian humanists on the whole were 
neither good nor bad philosophers, but no philosophers at all.” On the absence of 
humanism — indeed, of Renaissance philosophy in general — from the narrative of 
Western philosophy, see Hankins, 339. 
2 On this last aspect, see Bianchi, 136, who speaks of “una sorta ipertrofismo 
ermeneutico” and makes it clear that we should not ascribe this textual work to humanists 
only. 
3 Leibniz, 1969, 128; for the Latin, see Leibniz, 1966, 428. 
4 The work was published by Seth Viotto in Parma in 1553; copies are exceedingly rare. 
No other editions were published before Leibniz’s re-edition, Frankfurt, 1670 (which was 
reprinted with a new title page in 1674: Marii Nizolii Anti-barbarus philosophicus sive 
Philosophia Scholasticorum impugnata Libris IV). Leibniz’s assessment is to be found in 
Leibniz, 1966, 401–32: see, for example, 429; translated in Leibniz, 1969, 128. Leibniz, 
1966, 408, thinks Nizolio’s title too grand and prefers a title such as “Logica quaedam 
reformata et ad puram propriamque loquendi rationem revocata,” a logic reformed and 
brought back to a pure and proper account of speech. 
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5 Menn, 47. Of course, humanists also greatly contributed to the recovery, not only of the 
literary legacy of antiquity, but also of its scientific and philosophical achievements. The 
study of Stoicism, Epicureanism, Skepticism, and Neoplatonism widened the 
philosophical horizon, with creative new philosophies — for example, Lipsius’s Neo-
Stoicism, Montaigne’s skepticism, and Gassendi’s Epicurean atomism — as a result. 
Moreover, while humanists often did not pursue a philosophical agenda in the traditional 
sense, the assumptions and convictions that informed their textual and philological work 
were anything but philosophically irrelevant. 
6 Tillmann (though only briefly on Nizolio); Glossner. Leibniz 1966, 424, 428–29, 
connects Nizolio with Hobbes. On the affinity between Nizolio and Gilbert Ryle’s notion 
of category mistake, see below, n118. 
7 For example, Rossi; Vasoli, 606–32; Copenhaver and Schmitt, 207–09; Breen’s 
introduction to Nizolio, 1956. 
8 Cassirer, 1:151; cf. 2:133–35. In the same spirit, see Kondylis, 115–29, an excellent, 
brief discussion to which I am much indebted. 
9 Rummel, 159; cf. 162–64, 175–77, 182–83, 188–90. 
10 The small monograph by Wesseler is no exception; see below, n111.  
11 The work was supplemented by new word lists of Nizolio and others; the 1548 edition 
was entitled Nizolius sive Thesaurus Ciceronianus: see Breen’s introduction to Nizolio, 
1956, xxiii–xxvi. I have used the 1613 edition, printed in Frankfurt. 
12 Breen’s introduction to ibid., xv. Nizolio also published a translation of a lexicon of 
obsolete words in the Hippocratic writings of Galen. For a good summary of the polemics 
see Breen’s introduction to ibid.; Copenhaver and Schmitt, 207–09. 
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13 Breen’s introduction to Nizolio, 1956, xxi, xlvii n151; Breen. See Schmitt, 15: “one 
cannot unequivocally speak of a neat division of Ciceronians and anti-Ciceronians in the 
Renaissance.” See also n26 below. 
14 Breen’s introduction to Nizolio, 1956, xxii–xxiii. 
15 Nizolio, 1613, dedicatory page to Giovanni Francesco Gambara (no page number).  
16 Breen’s introduction to Nizolio, 1956, liii. 
17 Nizolio, 1956, 1:65 (1.6). Reference will be given to the volume and page number in 
Breen’s edition, followed by book and chapter division in the original. For a German 
translation, see Nizolio, 1980. 
18 Nizolio, 1956, 1:92 (1.8). 
19 On Valla’s program of ontological reduction, see Nauta, 13–125; on Valla and Nizolio, 
see Monfasani; Mack, 1993, 116. 
20 Valla, 1:48. 
21 Nizolio, 1956, 1:35 (1.2). 
22 Mack, 1993, 116. 
23 Agricola, 37–41; see Braakhuis; Friedrich. Vives, 1555, 1:582–92; on Vives, see Mack, 
2008. Melanchthon, 520; cf. Frank, 33–37. For Peter Ramus’s indecisive position on 
universals, see Ong, 208–09. 
24 Nizolio, 1956, 1:21–30 (1.1). 
25 Ibid., 27 (1.1): “non tam Platonem aut Aristotelem aut quempiam alium antiquum 
neotericumve Scriptorem quam quinque sensus, intelligentiam, cogitationem, memoriam, 
usum, et experientiam.” For similar sentiments in other humanists, see, for example, 
Valla, 1:1; Vives, 1971, 9. Vives’s emphasis on exploratio, observation, and induction is 
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well-known: for a brief discussion, including a comparison with Francis Bacon, see F. 
Watson’s preface to Vives, 1971, ciii–cxi. 
26 Schmitt, 72–73, referring to Nizolio, 1956, 2:190, where Nizolio makes a critical 
remark on the “Sceptica sive Ephectica et Academica nova, to which also Cicero 
belonged, that had confused things greatly and had rendered things uncertain”; in the 
introduction (ibid., 1:lix) Breen also notes that for Nizolio, Cicero is an eclectic, and that 
Nizolio himself disagrees with Cicero on a few occasions. On Cicero’s skepticism, see 
Görler. 
27 Ibid., 26–27: “libertas and vera licentia sentiendi ac judicandi de omnibus rebus ut 
veritas ipsa rerumque natura postulat.” 
28 Ibid., 26 (1.1); 2:80 (3.7). 
29 Ibid., 1:26 (1.1).  
30 Ibid., 147–48 (2.2). 
31 For example, Valla, 1:61: “popularis sermo atque eruditorum”; cf. ibid., 2:485; 1:6. For 
discussion, see Nauta, 276–80; Tavoni, 207–08. 
32 Valla, 2:548: “imperitorum (idest naturaliter loquentium).” 
33 Nizolio, 1956, 1:41–53 (1.4). 
34 Ibid., 37–40 (1.3). Cf. 59 (1.6) where the classes of things, created by “god or nature” 
(“a Deo sive a natura”) are said to be exactly the same in number as “the names and 
appellations imposed by grammarians and inventors of words” (“linguarum Authores et 
vocabulorum inventores nomina atque appellationes imposuerunt”). 
35 Ibid., 41–53, esp. 52 (1.4). 
36 Ibid., 42 (1.4). 
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37 Nizolio’s scheme at the end of De principiis (Nizolio, 1956, 2:196) is therefore 
somewhat misleading, because appellative names seem to be strictly divided into 
collective and simple names, while many simple names can become collective ones in the 
way explained by Nizolio in the text. For the same reason, it is confusing that he 
frequently refers to this category as “simple, non collective [names]” (“simplicia sive non 
collectiva”); for example, see ibid., 42 (1.4). 
38 Ibid., 50 (1.4). 
39 Ibid., 51 (1.4): “Nomina enim hominis et animalis et caetera huiusmodi nunquam 
significant genus vel speciem, vel aliquam naturam communem, nisi cum sunt figurate 
posita et accepta, et ea natura, quae his nominibus figurate positis significatur, nihil aliud 
est, nisi multitudo ex individuis composita et totum quoddam discretum, ex nullis aliis 
nisi ex singularibus vere constans. . . . Quod si eadem haec nomina hominis et animalis 
non semel tantum, ut in exemplo superiori, sed saepius ac multoties proferantur, ac 
diversis suppositis accomodentur, iam statim desinent significare unum tantum, et 
multorum ac plurium significationem accipient. Ut si quod ad nomen animalis attinet, id 
multoties proferam et diversis suppositis accomodem hoc pacto, homo est animal, bos est 
animal, leo est animal.” 
40 Ibid., 105 (1.10); 42–43 (2.2); see also 93 (1.8): “Both [Socrates and Plato] agree in 
having the same name man and in belonging to the same genus, just as two soldiers 
belong to the same army” (“Conveniunt enim quatenus ambo [Socrates and Plato] idem 
hominis nomen habent et in eodem genere hominum tanquam duo milites in eodem 
exercitu militum continentur”). 
41 Ibid., 44 (1.4); 84 (1.7). 
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42 Ibid., 43–44 (1.4). 
43 Ibid., 119–20 (2.1). 
44 Ibid., 52 (1.4): “On the other hand, an appellative name, when pronounced many times, 
signifies, as said, many things; when pronounced only once it signifies only one thing. I 
speak about its literal meaning here, not about its metaphorical meaning, for when used in 
its metaphorical meaning a name, even if pronounced only once, signifies many things” 
(“At nomen appellativum contra, si multoties, ut dixi, proferatur, multorum, si semel 
tantum, unius tantum habet significationem. De significatione propria loquor, non de 
figurata, nam figurate positum etiam si semel tantum pronuntietur, tamen multa 
significat”). But examples of the latter, such as genus and species themselves were said to 
be collective terms in their literal sense; see ibid., 42–43 (1.4). 
45 For example, ibid., 190 (2.8): following Valla, Nizolio maintains that there is only one 
true transcendental: thing (res); being (ens) can be reduced to thing, just like the other 
traditional transcendental terms. Everything is a subgroup of thing, which is the widest 
possible class, containing all things. For Valla’s position, see Valla, 1:11–21. 
46 For example, Nizolio, 1956, 1:98 (1.9). 
47 Ibid., 141 (2.2); and also 122 (2.1); 139 (2.2). 
48 Ibid., 97 (1.9); 115–34 (2.1). 
49 Ibid., 144 (2.2). Cf. Agricola, 54. Nizolio often quotes from and discusses Agricola, 
something overlooked in Mack’s otherwise excellent survey of Agricola’s influence in 
the sixteenth century: Mack, 1993, 280–372. Nizolio, 1956, 2:109–10 (4.1), writes about 
the significance of Agricola’s work when he himself was still a boy (puer). 
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50 Cicero, 1968, 65 (De inventione 1.32): “Often the same thing is a genus in relation to 
one thing and a species in relation to another. For example, man is a species of animal, 
but a genus of which Thebans or Trojans are species.” 
51 Nizolio, 1956, 1:140 (2.2). 
52 Ong, 203. 
53 Ramus, 14. 
54 In particular, Nizolio’s discussion of the authenticity of Aristotle’s works in the last 
book of his De principiis suggests an acquaintance with Ramus’s Aristotelicae 
animadversiones from 1543; see Breen’s note in Nizolio, 1956, 177n37, for some 
possible links, concluding that it was “praticamente impossibile ch’egli non abbia 
conosciuto le Animadversiones di Ramus.” On Périon, see Vasoli, 406n4. 
55 Ong, 203, and n20, from which it appears that this opinion was not yet present in the 
1543 edition of Ramus’s work, but can be found from 1552 onwards. 
56 Vives, 1:583, quoted by Nizolio, 1956, 1:140 (2.2): “non migrabant ab effectione 
essentiali in diversam.” 
57 Nizolio, 1956, 1:141 (2.2). 
58 Ong, 204. 
59 Nizolio, 1956, 1:138 (2.2). 
60 Ibid., 115–35 (2.1). 
61 Ibid., 121 (2.1): “alia substantialia, ut animal, quod est genus substantiale homini, est 
enim animal ita in substantia hominis insitum, ut homo sine animali nullo pacto esse 
possit; alia accidentialia. . . . Ut in summa sint septem generum subalternorum, sive modi, 
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